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COMMENT
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION-THE ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS-Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.: THE AFTERMATH-The
Supreme Court did not extend the judicial exception to arbitrability of
antitrust issues in the landmark decision of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc." The Court held that statutory antitrust
issues resulting from an international transaction are arbitrable pursu-
ant to the Federal Arbitration Act2 (the "Arbitration Act") and the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards' (the "Convention") despite the doctrine of American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co.,' which held that antitrust
disputes are inappropriate for arbitration." The Court's decision is sig-
nificant in view of its impact on the conduct of international com-
merce.' Moreover, Mitsubishi recognizes the respect that arbitration
commands in the international community.
I. BACKGROUND
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation ("Mitsubishi"), a Japanese corpo-
ration and a joint venture of Chrysler International S.A. ("CISA") and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,7 entered into a sales agreement in 19798
1. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
3. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter Convention].
4. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). This doctrine has been uniformly followed by several
circuit courts. See infra note 64.
5. 391 F.2d at 828.
6. See Hollering, Mitsubishi: Arbitrability and Antitrust Claims, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19,
1985, at 1, col. 1; Newman & Burrows, Judicial Intervention in Arbitration of Interna-
tional Claims, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
7. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d 155, 157 (1st Cir.
1983). Mitsubishi was formed as a joint venture between CISA, a Swiss corporation and
wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. Chrysler Corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Inc., a Japanese corporation. This joint venture was designed to promote Mitsubishi
manufactured vehicles for sale in certain territories outside the continental United
States through Chrysler dealers. 473 U.S. at 616-17.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
with Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ("Soler"), a Puerto Rican corpora-
tion. The agreement provided for the sale of Mitsubishi automobiles to
Soler9 and contained an arbitration clause which presents the issue
herein. 10
In mid-1981, Soler could not maintain its minimum sales require-
ments and requested that Mitsubishi allow it to transship some of its
volume elsewhere." Mitsubishi, citing various reasons, denied Soler's
request. Eventually, Mitsubishi had to withhold a large shipment of
vehicles to Soler. In February 1982, Soler disclaimed responsibility for
payment of these vehicles.'1 Subsequently, Mitsubishi brought an ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico" seeking an order to compel arbitration of this dispute pursuant
to the sales agreement, 5 the Federal Arbitration Act' and the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.1 7
In addition to denying Mitsubishi's allegations, Soler counterclaimed
against both Mitsubishi and CISA alleging violations of several stat-
8. 473 U.S. at 617. CISA was also a party to this agreement as it was part of the joint
venture. On the same day, Soler entered into a separate distributorship agreement with
CISA that provided for the sale of Mitsubishi vehicles by Soler within a designated area
of Puerto Rico. Id.
9. Id.
10. Paragraph VI of the sales agreement, entitled "Arbitration of Certain Matters,"
provided: "All disputes controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsub-
ishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to articles I-B through V of this Agreement or for
the breach thereof shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." Id.
11. 723 F.2d at 157. For the first two years of the agreement, Soler maintained a
strong sales record. In 1981, however, Soler fell victim to a lagging new car market. 473
U.S. at 617. Soler desired to transship these extra vehicles to Central and South America
as well as the continental United States. 723 F.2d at 157.
12. 473 U.S. at 618 n.1. This denial was based on practical and policy rationale.
These vehicles were not outfitted with heaters or defoggers because they were designed
for Puerto Rico. In addition, they required unleaded high-octane fuel which was unavail-
able in Latin America. For these reasons, a warranty could not be ensured. There were
also concerns that transshipment to the United States would violate agreements between
CISA and Mitsubishi. Furthermose, a diversion of these autos would have had a negative
effect on the Japanese trade policy of limiting imports to the United States. Id.
13. Id. Mitsubishi stored 966 vehicles in Japan which represented orders for May,
June and July 1981. Id.
14. 723 F.2d at 157. The suit alleged nonpayment for the stored vehicles, nonpay-
ment of contractual storage penalties and damage to Mitsubishi's warranties and good-
will, expiration of Soler's distributorship, and other breaches of the sales agreement.
15. See supra note 8.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
17. See supra note 3.
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utes, s including antitrust violations under the Sherman Act."9
The district court ordered arbitration of all the statutory issues.20
Despite the rule of American Safety holding that causes of action
under the antitrust laws are inappropriate for enforcement by arbitra-
tion, the district court held the antitrust claims arbitrable due to the
international character of the Mitsubishi-Soler commercial relation-
ship.2' Soler appealed the district court's decision.
18. 433 U.S. at 619. Soler asserted causes of action under the Federal Auto Dealers'
Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1982 & Supp. 1986). There were two counter-
claims under this Act: Mitsubishi, (1) "acted in bad faith in establishing minimum sales
volumes for Soler"; and (2) "attempted to coerce and intimidate Soler into accepting a
proposal to replace Soler with its own subsidiary." 723 F.2d at 161. The Act states:
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer
• . . in any district court of the United States.. . by reason of the failure...
[of] manufacturer. . . to act in good faith in performing or complying with any
of the terms or provisions of the franchise or in terminating, cancelling or not
renewing . . . provided that in any such suit the manufacturer shall not be
barred from asserting in defense of any such action the failure of the dealer to
act in good faith.
15 U.S.C. § 1222. Soler also asserted a cause of action under the Puerto Rican Competi-
tion Statute, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 257-259 (1978). These statutes forbid conspiracy
in restraint of trade and unfair methods of competition. 723 F.2d at 161.
Another statute allegedly violated was the Puerto Rican Dealers' Contract Act. The
Act provides that notwithstanding otherwise, "no principal or grantor may directly or
indirectly perform any act detrimental to the established relationship or refuse to renew
said contract on its normal expiration, except for just cause." P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 10, §
278 (1978 & Supp. 1983). Soler's counterclaim under this Act alleged that Mitsubishi
refused to comply with the terms and conditions of the sales agreement regarding orders
for products. 723 F.2d at 159-60. Soler also alleged that Mitsubishi had violated the sales
agreement by refusing to ship ordered vehicles, by failing to pay for warranty work, and
for bad faith in establishing minimum sales volumes. 473 U.S. at 619 n.5. In addition,
Soler claimed that Mitsubishi defamed Soler's name and reputation. Id. at n.6.
19. 473 U.S. at 619-20. Pursuant to the Sherman [Antitrust] Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982), Soler claimed that Mitsubishi and CISA had conspired against Soler by preclud-
ing Soler from reselling autos in either North or South America. Soler further alleged
that Mitsubishi and CISA prevented Soler from transshipping the vehicles by withhold-
ing necessary parts such as heaters and defoggers which would convert them into accept-
able vehicles in other areas. Soler also asserted that Mitsubishi and CISA wanted to
remove Soler as a distributor to install a wholly owned subsidiary as the exclusive dis-
tributor of Mitsubishi autos in Puerto Rico. Id. at 623-24. See also 723 F.2d at 173-74.
20. 473 U.S. at 620. The district court ruled that the arbitration clause did not cover
the claims regarding defamation, discrimination or the establishment of minimum sales
volumes. Id. at n.7. The district court opinion is unreported. For the text of the opinion,
see Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Appendix B at B-10.
21. 473 U.S. at 621. The American Safety doctrine had been followed by several
other circuit courts. See infra note 64. The district court, however, relied on Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which held that arbitration of a claim under the
Securities Exhange Act of 1934 was enforceable pursuant to a forum selection clause of
an international agreement. Id.; see also infra note 94.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
the district court's order to arbitrate all the statutory claims,2 includ-
ing those under the Sherman Act.23 After determining that these statu-
tory claims were encompassed in the arbitration clause,24 the Court of
Appeals opined that certain claims were nonarbitrable due to the judi-
cially created policy set forth in American Safety.25 The court re-
22. 723 F.2d at 155. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals was not persuaded
by Soler's reliance on Section b(2) of the Puerto Rican Dealers' Contract Act which
reads: "any stipulation that obligates a dealer . . . to arbitrate ... any controversy...
regarding [the] dealer's contract outside of Puerto Rico or under foreign law . . . " is
void. See supra note 18. The First Circuit declared this section preempted by federal
law. The court noted that pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) arbitration agreements are
valid and enforceable. 723 F.2d at 158.
The court determined that Soler's counterclaim under the Puerto Rico Dealers' Con-
tract Act, was "plainly within the arbitration clause." 723 F.2d at 160. This counterclaim
was predicated on the premise that Mitsubishi refused to comply with the terms and
conditions of the sales agreement. According to the court, these terms and conditions,
however, were contained in article I of the sales agreement. 723 F.2d at 159-160. See
supra note 10 for the text of the Sales agreement, paragraph VI.
The court held that Soler's counterclaim under the federal Auto Dealers' Day in
Court Act, restated allegations under the Puerto Rico Dealers' Contract Act and the
Sherman Act. The court, however, affirmed the district court's ruling that the allegations
under the minimum sales agreement were outside the scope of the arbitration clause. 723
F.2d at 161.
Regarding the counterclaim brought under the Puerto Rican antitrust statute, the
court ruled that it was within the arbitration clause as were the previous statutory coun-
terclaims. It was not, however, within the scope of the clause "to the same extent as
Soler's federal Dealers' Day in Court claim." Id. See also supra note 18.
23. The court determined that Soler's claims under the Sherman Act, were within the
arbitration clause because they involved provisions of the sales agreement. The provi-
sions included: art. I-D(1) (dealer's orders "firm"), art. I-E (penalties for nonshipment),
art. I-F (payment obligations and payment procedure). 723 F.2d at 160.
Soler's counterclaim raised on the transshipment issue was deemed within the scope
of the arbitration clause because it resulted in relevant Mitsubishi defenses (e.g., Soler's
inexperience with ocean shipping, overseas regulations and unsuitablity of specifications
of vehicles for other countries) which implicated article IV of the sales agreement. Article
IV states, the "manner in which [Solar] . . . shall use [Mitsubishi's] Trademarks is sub-
ject to prior approval by (Mitsubishi]. . . . In the event that (Mitsubishi] shall object to
the manner in which BUYER or any Controlled Person is using or allowing Dealers to
use any Trademark,. . . BUYER agrees promptly to remedy the situation to [Mitsub-
ishi's] satisfaction." Id. at 161.
24. Id. at 159-61; see also 473 U.S. at 621-22 nn.8-9.
25. 723 F.2d at 162. The First Circuit arrived at this conclusion via a three-step anal-
ysis. Id. First, pursuant to American Safety, the court ascertained that the exception to
arbitrability of antitrust claims applies not only to domestic, but also to international
agrements, which, as in the instant case, governs the sales and distribution of vehicles in
the United States. Id. at 163. The court found this in accordance with the Convention.
Second, the court concluded that Scherk, did not compel arbitration of the antitrust
claims in the instant case. 723 F.2d at 167. Third, the court found that, in view of its
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manded the case to the district court to adjudicate the arbitrable and
nonarbitrable matters."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2" in Mitsubishi first to de-
termine whether the parties' arbitration agreement included the statu-
tory issues, and if so, to consider the primary issue of whether an
American court should enforce an arbitration agreement that stems
from an international transaction. 8 Several amicus curiae briefs were
filed with the Court in addition to the briefs of Mitsubishi and Soler.2 9
In a five to three decision delivered by Justice Blackmun,30 the
Supreme Court confirmed the court of appeals ruling that Soler's stat-
utory claims were within the arbitration clause."' The Court reversed
the court of appeals,s2 however, holding that these antitrust claims
were arbitrable pursuant to the Arbitration Act because the Act did
not provide for "implying in every contract within its ken a presump-
tion against arbitration of statutory claims." 3  Moreover, the Court
found no reason to depart from the "liberal federal policy favoring ar-
bitration agreements.""' The Court further held that it was in the best
interest of the international commercial system to prescribe enforce-
ment of the arbitration clause.35
holding of nonarbitrability, the district court could look at the permeation of the anti-
trust claims and their likelihood of success, and decide whether Soler's antitrust claims
were separable. Id. at 169. If the claims were separable, the district court would have
discretion to stay a determination of these claims pending arbitration. Id.
26. Id. See also 473 U.S. at 623-24 n.12. Soler argued that the arbitration proceedings
should be stayed because the antitrust issues "permeated the claims in arbitration." Id.
27. 469 U.S. 916 (1984).
28. 473 U.S. at 624.
29. The International Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration Associa-
tion were granted leave to file amicus curiae briefs. 469 U.S. 1102 (1984). These briefs
supported the arbitrability of the antitrust claims. In addition, the Solicitor General was
invited to express the views of the United States government which supported Soler. 104
S. Ct. 2677 (1984). The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the American Automobile
Dealers Association also filed briefs in support of Soler.
30. 473 U.S. at 615. (Chief Justice Burger, Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Conner
joined Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell took no part in the decision).
31. Id. at 624. Soler did not argue against the First Circuit's interpretation of para-
graph VI of the sales agreement. Rather, Soler argued that, as a matter of law, a court
may not "construe an arbitration agreement to encompass [statutory claims] . . . 'unless
[that party] has expressly agreed.'" Id. Thus, the Supreme Court did not review the
scope of the arbitration agreement as interpreted by the court of appeals. Id. at n.13.
32. Id. at 630.
33. Id. at 624.
34. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 402-404 (1967).
35. 473 U.S. at 627-630.
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II. UNITED STATES ARBITRATION POLICY
A. Federal Statutory Issues
The Federal Arbitration Act was promulgated in 1925.16 Section 2
of the Arbitration Act specifies the types of arbitrable agreements sub-
ject to the statute8 7 Section 3 requires a federal court to stay litigation
on any issue within the arbitration clause and compel arbitration when
demanded.8 This provision demonstrates a federal policy favoring ar-
bitration agreements. 39 It was Congress' intent in implementing the Ar-
bitration Act "to enforce private agreements into which the parties had
entered."40 This intent created a duty for the courts to "rigorously en-
force agreements to arbitrate." '41 Section 2, however, does not mention
agreements for arbitration of statutory claims.42 Prior to the instant
case, enforcement of arbitration agreements under the Arbitration Act
36. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883-86 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
For a more detailed discussion of the Federal Arbitration Act, see Healy, An Introduc-
tion to the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 223-24 (1982).
37. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court . . . upon being satisfied that the issue . . . is refera-
ble to arbitration under such agreement, shall on application of one of the par-
ties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had.
See also 9 U.S.C. §4 (regarding petition of district court for an order requiring
arbitration).
39. 473 U.S. at 624; see Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 1. See also 65 CONG. REc. 1931
(1924) ("[The Arbitration Act] creates no new legislation, grants no new rights, except a
remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.");
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926) (the Act places an arbitration agree-
ment "upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.") This policy had
already been accepted by the courts when the Arbitration Act was approved. See Cohn &
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Act, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 283-84 (1926).
40. 473 U.S. at 625, quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985).
41. Id. The Court in Byrd added that these agreements should be enforced "even if
the result is piecemeal litigation." 470 U.S. at 221.




always involved contract claims.' 8
The Court first addressed the resolution of statutory claims pursu-
ant to arbitration in Wilko v. Swan." In Wilko, an arbitration agree-
ment for claims arising under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 4 was held unenforceable despite the Federal Arbitration Act."
The Court relied on Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 which
voids any "stipulation" waiving compliance with any "provision" of the
Securities Act of 1933. " The Court interpreted this section as voiding
an arbitration agreement that waived the right to a remedy in a court
of competent jurisdiction.48 More importantly, the Court noted Con-
gress' "hope for [the Arbitration Act's] usefulness both in controversies
based on statutes or on standards otherwise created." Wilko has since
been interpreted as establishing a limited statutory claims exception to
the Federal Arbitration Act.5 0
Since Wilko, the Court has held statutory claims to be nonarbitra-
ble for certain types of disputes. 51 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,52 the Court held that arbitration of an employment discrimination
claim would not preclude an employee's statutory right to damages
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51 The Court distin-
guished statutory and contractual rights subject to an arbitration
clause and concluded that arbitration is an inadequate forum for reso-
lution of rights established by Title VII. "'
43. 473 U.S. at 646. See Levya v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857,
863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979). In Levya, the Ninth Circuit determined
"that despite the general rule that arbitration clauses should be broadly construed...
contracts which provide for arbitration of contract disputes should not be read to require
arbitration of statutory claims absent express provisions for such arbitration." 593 F.2d
at 863.
44. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, a customer sued his brokerage firm under the Se-
curities Act of 1933 for misrepresentation regarding the sale of stock.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
46. 346 U.S. at 435.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1982).
48. 346 U.S. at 435.
49. Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
50. See Newman & Burrows, supra note 6, at 22, col. 1.
51. The Second Circuit discussed this nonarbitrability in Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d
439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953):
We think that the remedy a statute provides for violation of the statutory
right it creates may be sought not only in any "court of competent jurisdiction"
but also in any other competent tribunal, such as arbitration, unless the right
itself is of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration. ...
52. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
53. Id. at 59-60.
54. Id. at 56. "This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator, whose
task is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted
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A similar issue was decided in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc."5 which held that an arbitration agreement did
not bar an employee's claim based on the Fair Labor Standards Act."
The Court questioned the authority of an arbitrator in granting relief
for a violation of a statutory right. 7 Likewise, in McDonald v. City of
West Branch,58 the Court held that claims under the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871 were nonarbitrable.59 None of these cases, however, in-
volved the arbitration of antitrust claims. 0
B. Antitrust Claims
The leading case regarding arbitration of antitrust claims prior to
the implementation of the Convention"1 by Congress was American
Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co.6 2 In American Safety,
an American licensee, attempting to relieve itself of royalty obligations,
brought an action against an American licensor on grounds of antitrust
violations under the Sherman Act. The assignee of the licensor's roy-
alty rights attempted to invoke an arbitration clause within the license
agreement. The Second Circuit held the agreement unenforceable thus
establishing an antitrust exception to the federal policy favoring arbi-
legislation .... [In addition,] the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primar-
ily to the law of the ship, not the law of the land." Id. at 56-57.
55. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 744-45. "Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the
parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the
public policies underlying the FLSA [statute] thus depriving the employees of protected
statutory rights." Id. The Court determined that "[tlhese statutory questions must be
revealed in light of volumes of legislative history and over four decades of legal interpre-
tation and administrative rulings." Id. at 743.
58. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
59. Id. at 292. In McDonald, the Court declined to fashion a federal common law rule
permitting a federal court to accord res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an unap-
pealable arbitration award brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1803. The Court rea-
soned that "although arbitration is well suited to resolve contract disputes ... it cannot
provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statu-
tory and onstitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard." Id. Moreover, the
Court held that " '[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts be-
tween the states and people, as guardians of the people's rights-to protect people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law.'" Id. (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 255, 242 (1972)).
60. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
61. See infra notes 77-79 for applicable text of the Convention.
62. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tration s3 This doctrine of nonarbitrability has been affirmed by many
other circuit courts.
6 4
As diluted by the First Circuit in Mitsubishi,6" the doctrine has
four ingredients:6 6 (1) private parties asserting antitrust claims play an
instrumental role in the status of antitrust law. Such plaintiffs are like
"private attorney general(s) who protect the public's interest; 6 7
(2) "the strong possibility that contracts which generate antitrust dis-
putes may be contracts of adhesion militates against automatic forum
determination by contract;"' s (3) judicial, rather than arbitration pro-
ceedings are more beneficial to cases involving antitrust because such
issues tend to be complicated;as (4) antitrust regulation decisions are
too important to be left to arbitrators "chosen from the business com-
munity-particularly those from a foreign community that has had no
experience with or exposure to our law and values. 7 0 The Second Cir-
cuit in American Safety concluded "that the pervasive public interest
in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that
arise in such cases combine to make . . . antitrust claims inappropriate
for arbitration." ' Therefore, the court "did not believe that Congress
63. Id. at 828. The Second Circuit limited its holding four years later to future dis-
pute clauses, holding post-dispute arbitration agreements invalid. Coenen v. R.W. Press-
prich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 49 (5th
Cir. 1974) (rationale is that such a clause is similar to a settlement and is encouraged).
64. See, e.g., Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1477-80 (9th
Cir. 1984); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st
Cir. 1983); Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th
Cir. 1978); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976);
Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Institute, Inc., 456 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972);
Helfenbein v. International Industries, Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
65. 723 F.2d at 162.
66. 391 F.2d at 826-27. Courts and commentators have supplemented the doctrine for
several other reasons. See Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in Interna-
tional Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of
the World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. Irr'L. L. & POL. 361, 402-03 (1986), for a summary of
these reasons.
67. 391 F.2d at 826. This public interest stems from the effect that antitrust viola-
tions can have on the economy. Id.
68. 723 F.2d at 162, quoted in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632. See also Loevinger, Anti-
trust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1085, 1091 (1969).
69. 723 F.2d at 162. See also Loevinger supra note 68, at 1090; Pitofsky, Arbitration
& Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072, 1077 (1969).
70. 723 F.2d at 162.
71. 391 F.2d at 827-28. The court's rationale was that a "claim under the antitrust
law is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national
interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act
has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public's interest. [In
addition,] [a]ntitrust violations can effect hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of
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intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere than in the courts. 7 2
C. The Road to Mitsubishi
In 1970, two years after the American Safety decision, the United
States consented to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awardss7 3 an agreement to facilitate interna-
tional arbitration. Since the implementation of the Convention under
Section 201 of the Arbitration Act 7 4 there has been little adjudication
of its provisions.76 The goal of the Convention and the principal pur-
pose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, is to en-
courage the propagation and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by
which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are en-
forced in the signatory states.7 6
people and inflict staggering economic damage." Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
72. 391 F.2d at 827.
73. Convention, supra note 3. The Convention is sometimes referred to as the "New
York Convention" because it was drafted at the United Nations. The Convention's scope
is defined in Article 1 (1) which states:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recogni-
tion and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences
between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards
not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and en-
forcement are sought.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970 & 1986 Supp.). Nearly one-third of the world's states have ratified
this treaty. Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A
Comparison of Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW 1685, 1688 n.16 (1983).
See generally Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW 269 (1979); Aksen, Ameri-
can Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 3 S.W.U.L. REv. 1 (1971). See McMahon, Implementation of the United Na-
tions Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MA L. &
COMM. 735 (1971), for discussions on the Convention and its adoption by the United
States. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059-1074 (1961) for a discussion of the background of the Convention before adoption
by the United States.
74. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982) provides that "[t]he Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in the
United States courts in accordance with this chapter."
75. 723 F.2d at 164, see also Saunders, supra note 73, at 270. A recent study of inter-
national arbitration cases in United States courts notes that many have ignored the Con-
vention when it should have been applied. Allison, supra note 66, at 420.
76. See S. Exec. Doc. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. 19 (1968). See generally Quigley,
supra note 73, at 1059-60.
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Nevertheless, the Convention provides several approaches to chal-
lenging or defending against arbitration. Article II provides that each
signatory state shall recognize a written arbitration agreement "con-
cerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration."" If not
"capable of arbitration," a court does not have to enforce the agree-
ment. Courts in the signatory states are compelled to refer actions gov-
erned by arbitration agreements to arbitration unless they find that
the agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed."' 8 Article V(1) provides that arbitration awards may be re-
fused enforcement if the party against whom the award is being en-
forced offers proof of a valid defense."9 Furthermore, Article V(2)
77. Convention, supra note 3, at art. l(1). The text of Article II (1)-(2) provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a con-
tract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an ex-
change of letters or telegrams.
78. Id. art. 11(3). The text of Article 11(3) provides:
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this
article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration,
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed.
79. Id. art. V(1). The text of Article V(1) provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the compe-
tent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that
(a) the parties to the agreement referred to in article II were under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agree-
ment is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected
it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country
where the award was made; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains de-
cisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitra-
tion, provided that, if the decision on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters, submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority of the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
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allows a court to refuse enforcement of an award if it finds that:
(a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the laws of that country; or (b) the recognition or
enforcement of the arbitral award would be contrary to public policy of
that country.80
Articles II(3) and V(2)(b) have been interpreted as coextensive de-
spite the fact that Article II refers to arbitration "agreements" and Ar-
ticle V refers to arbitral "awards."81 Article II applies when a court
action has been started regardless of a written arbitration agreement. s2
Article V applies when arbitration is complete and an award has been
made but not enforced.8 3 Since the ratification of the Convention,
courts have liberally interpreted its provisions despite its drafting
inconsistencies."
Article V(2) has been the source of much debate.85 It has been de-
scribed as an "unfortunate provision" because of the conflict it has
generated about the application of public policy.88 Generally, however,
the public policy exception has been narrowly interpreted. 87
The adoption of the Convention into American statutory law dis-
played the recognition of forum selection clauses 8 for the resolution of
international disputes.89 In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.," the Su-
where the arbitration took place; or
(e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
80. Id. art. V(2).
81. Ledee v. Cermiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982); see also Antco Ship-
ping Co. v. Sidernar S.P.A., 417 F. Supp. 207, 215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 931
(2d Cir. 1977).
82. Saunders, supra note 73, at 277.
83. Id.
84. Allison, supra note 66, at 385.
85. Aksen, supra note 73, at 13; Barry, supra note 73, at 838-43.
86. Aksen, supra note 73, at 13.
87. Saunders, supra note 73, at 271 (of 100 reported cases, enforcement disallowed
three times for public policy reasons). See Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (Convention overrides
a nation's parochial interests as a defense to arbitration).
88. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. A forum selection clause is an agreement to submit in
advance to the jurisdiction of a given court for the resolution of a specified dispute.
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
89. One of the goals of the convention was to encourage the utilization of commercial
arbitration agreements. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15. See Quigley, supra note 73, at
1050-51.
90. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). In Bremen, a German corporation made an agreement to tow
an American company's rig. The agreement contained a forum selection clause providing
for litigation in London. Subsequently, the rig was damaged in a storm and the Ameri-
can company brought an action in a United States district court. The German company
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preme Court noted that forum selection clauses "should be given full
effect"'" when "a freely negotiated private international agreement [is]
unaffected by fraud." 2 Bremen established a well defined policy rea-
son for acknowledging such agreements. The Court explained: [T]he
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist upon a paro-
chial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts.93
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver,4 the Court, following Bremen, found
that an arbitration agreement was a "specialized kind of forum selec-
tion clause that posits not only the situs of the suit but also the proce-
dure to be used in resolving this dispute."'" The Scherk Court, revers-
ing the Seventh Circuit," in a five to four decision,' 7 enforced the
arbitration agreement for claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Although the Court distinguished Scherk from Wilko v. Swan,
it primarily relied on Scherk's international context to reach its deci-
sion. 9 Wilko could have been distinguished on the basis that the Se-
curities Act of 1934 did not have a provision prohibiting waiver of
rights similar to the provision under the Securities Act of 1933. While
the 1933 Act contained an express cause of action, the 1934 Act's cause
of action was implied. °00 Instead, the Court followed the policy reason-
ing of Bremen. The Court opined that "[a] parochial refusal by the
courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement
sought to dismiss this suit and brought an action in London pursuant to the clause in the
contract. The forum selection clause was held binding. Id.
91. Id. at 13.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 9.
94. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In Scherk, an American manufacturer purchased several en-
terprises and trademarks from a German citizen. The sales contract, negotiated in the
United States, England, and Germany, signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland, con-
tained an arbitration clause. The American manufacturer brought an action in district
court under violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
The Court held that the clause was valid. 417 U.S. at 519-20.
95. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.
96. Id. at 507, rev'g, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973). The Seventh Circuit relied on
Wilko in reaching its decision. Judge John Paul Stevens dissented. Judge Stevens was
later appointed to the United States Supreme Court and wrote the dissenting opinion in
Mitsubishi.
97. 417 U.S. at 507. Justice Stewart authored the opinion and was joined by Justices
Blackman, Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas authored the dissenting opin-
ion and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
98. Id. at 516-17.
99. Id. at 518-19.
100. Allison, supra note 66, at 434.
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would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite unseemly
and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical lit-
igation advantages." 10
The Court, assuming that the claims would have been nonarbitra-
ble had they arisen from a domestic transaction, 102 further distin-
guished Scherk from Wilko. Scherk differed from Wilko because it was
uncertain if United States law would be applied to the dispute. This
uncertainty would encourage forum shopping and "would surely dam-
age the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international com-
mercial agreements.' 03 Finally, while the Court did not rely on the
Convention for its decision, it did add that its decision was consistent
with the recent adoption of the Convention by the United States.'0
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that neither the Convention
nor Bremen "justifie[d] abandonment of a national public policy that
securities claims be heard by judicial forum simply because some inter-
national elements are involved in a contract."' 05 Douglas condemned
the majority's reliance on the international context of the case.'06 He
reasoned that Wilko applied in all cases involving federal securities
statutes. 07 Furthermore, he asserted that it was the role of Congress to
establish an exception to the decision in Wilko v. Swan.'"8
Nevertheless, after Scherk, lower federal courts continued to hold
antitrust cases nonarbitrable even in an international setting.0 9 More-
101. 417 U.S. 516-17.
102. Id. at 506.
103. Id. at 517.
104. Id. at 520 n.15.
105. Id. at 530 n.10 (Douglas J., dissenting). Douglas claimed that § 29(a) of the 1934
Act made arbitration agreements under § 10 of the Act "null and void" and "inopera-
tive" under Article 11(3) of the Convention. Id. at 524. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act
provides: "any ... stipulation or provision binding any person to waive compliance with
any provision of this [Act] . . . shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Section 29 adds
that, "[e]very contract" made in violation of the Act "shall be void." Douglas noted that
no exception is made in the Act "for contracts which have an international character."
Id. at 524. The Scherk Court concluded that Section 29 of the 1934 Act was similar to
Section 14 of the 1933 Act but distinguished the jurisdictional provisions of the Acts. Id.
at 514.
106. Id. at 529, 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 533. Justice Douglas qualified this by stating that these laws "apply
whether the defendant is foreign or American, and whether or not there are transna-
tional elements in the dealing." Id.
108. Id. at 533.
109. See, e.g., Lake Communication, 738 F.2d at 1473; Sem Reisfeld, 530 F.2d at 679;
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afl'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). Cf. Sauer-Getriebe, KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 714
F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984); La Societe Nationale v.
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over, antitrust claims were not the only statutory issues excepted from
arbitration. Claims arising out of international commercial transactions
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organization Act
(RICO) were analogized to antitrust claims and held nonarbitrable
under the American Safety rationale."10
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, however,
the Supreme Court elevated the rationale underlying Scherk above
that of the lower courts resulting in an affirmation of international
arbitration.
III. THE MITSUBISHI DECISION
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi was faced with an agreement to
arbitrate antitrust claims resulting from an international transac-
tion."' Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began by address-
ing Soler's contention that the arbitration clause must specifically
mention whether claims arising under a certain statute may be arbi-
trated."2 The Court's conclusion favoring arbitration was compelled by
its recent holdings in Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp."s
and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.11 4 The Court, in rejecting
Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 260 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 251 (1984).
110. S.A. Mineracao Da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah International, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) aff'd 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984). The district court reasoned that
the "general public interest in the enforcement of RICO [18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970),] is
at least as great as the public interest in the enforcement of antitrust laws." 576 F. Supp.
at 575. This public interest is more significant than that in the enforcement of ordinary
securities fraud claims as in Scherk. Id. at 576. Arbitration issues apply to civil RICO
actions. For example, if a party was a victim of fraud and the fraud was subject to the
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, or the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, that
party would have a civil claim. If the fraud was part of an international contract which
included an arbitration clause, the victim would be able to seek treble damages under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(a) before a court if the clause was held unenforceable or before an arbitral
tribunal if the clause was enforceable. Newman and Burrows, "Will RICO Move Abroad
Through International Arbitration?," N.Y.L.J., November 21, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
111. 473 U.S. at 624.
112. 473 U.S. at 624. Soler argued that because it was a member of a class for whose
benefit the antitrust laws were passed, the arbitration clause can not be interpreted to
include arbitration of these statutory claims. Id.
113. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). The Court stated that "[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that,
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitration issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration ...... 473 U.S. at 625 (quoting Moses Cone, 460
U.S. at 24).
114. 470 U.S. 213 (1985) ("passage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered, and we must
not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous
impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the underlying motiva-
tion). Id. at 218.
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Soler's contention, held that it had no reason to depart from such
guidelines' 6 and could not find any "basis [in the Arbitration Act] for
disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims . -'"6 The
Court felt this was especially true since Congress had not displayed
any intent otherwise." 7
Justice Blackmun then turned to the primary issue of Mitsubishi:
the arbitrability of the antitrust claims." 8 Justice Blackmun displayed
the Court's reliance on Scherk and B~emen in noting that these cases
"establish[ed] a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of freely
negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions."'" 9 Before evincing
its rationale, however, the Court expressed its skepticism of the Ameri-
can Safety doctrine. 20 The Court did not agree that the presence of an
antitrust dispute is per se nonarbitrable.12 ' The Court also disagreed
with American Safety's determination that arbitrators could not prop-
erly resolve an antitrust matter. 2 The complexity of antitrust issues
was deemed insufficient to discourage arbitration. 23 The Court pro-
115. 473 U.S. at 626.
116. Id. at 628.
117. Id. (no Congressional intent found in either the legislative history or text, unlike
the protection against waiver provision found in the Securities Act of 1933). See Wilko,
346 U.S. at 434-35. See also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
118. 473 U.S. 628. Justice Blackmun acknowledged the correctness of the First Cir-
cuit's two-step inquiry of the issues. Id. That is, "first determining whether the parties'
agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then, upon finding that it did,
considering whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the
arbitration of those claims." Id. at 628.
119. Id. at 631. The Court added that this policy is enforced by the federal policy
favoring arbitration and it is now extended to the arena of international commerce. Id. at
631-32.
120. Id. at 632. The Court illustrated the ingredients of the American Safety doc-
trine as had the First Circuit. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text. The Court,
however, refused to assess the American Safety doctrine with respect to its application
to arbitration agreements arising out of domestic transactions. Id. at 628-29.
121. Id. at 633. The Court did not dispute the fact, however, that a party may attack
the validity of an agreement to arbitrate. Id. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
122. 473 U.S. at 634. The Court noted that the arbitration panel selected to hear the
claims in the instant case was composed of three Japanese lawyers: a former law school
dean, a former judge, and an attorney with American legal training who published works
in Japanese antitrust law. Id. at 634 n.18. This conclusion is questionable. See Lipner,
International Antitrust Law: To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& EcoN. 395, 425 (1985); Loevinger, supra note 68, at 1090; Pitofsky, supra note 69, at
1078. Such competent arbitral tribunals may not always be selected for such complicated
issues. Lipner, supra, at 428.
123. 473 U.S. at 623. The Court "merely noted that sufficient complexity did not
exist in [Mitsubishil." Lipner, supra note 122 at 425. Thus, future challenges to Mitsub-
ishi may be available. Id.
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ceeded to discuss the crux of the American Safety doctrine: the public
interest underlying the Sherman Act and the private cause of action
provided by the statute.12 This private cause of action includes the
right to sue and recover treble damages. 128 Based on the freedom an
individual has in bringing forth an antitrust claim, the Court reasoned
that such a litigant is entitled to establish an accordable procedure in
advance for the resolution of any disputes. 2' The Court found that
international arbitration was an adequate mechanism for such
resolution. 27
Justice Blackmun concluded by commenting on the influence of
international arbitration on the international commercial system"2 8 and
the influence of a national policy favoring commercial arbitration.' 9
The Court, observing that this policy did not include any exceptions,
was hesitant to establish such an exception due to congressional silence
on the issue. 2 ° The Court added that there should be no reason for
international arbitration to be ineffectual since arbitrators will be
bound to decide disputes "in accord with the national law giving rise to
the claim." ' Thus, the Court reasoned, "the [antitrust] statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.' ' 32 The
protection of American public interest against inadequate arbitration,
the Court explicated, would be provided for under the Convention so
American federal courts would have the opportunity to refuse enforce-
124. 473 U.S. at 634-35. See American Safety Equip., 391 F.2d at 826-27.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This is the original Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The Court explained that the treble damages provision
made available to an antitrust plaintiff "is a chief tool in the antitrust enforcement
scheme, posing a crucial deterrent to potential violators." 105 S. Ct. at 3358. See Perma
Life Mufflers Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968). The Court has been
criticized for failing to recognize the importance of the treble damages remedy. Lipner,
supra note 121, at 418, 424. Under the Act, a plaintiff is also entitled to seek injunctive
relief. 15 U.S.C. § 26. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. Id.
126. 473 U.S. at 636.
127. Id. The Court disregarded the fact that auto manufacturers have overwhelming
bargaining power over dealers. Lipner, supra note 122, at 423-24.
128. 473 U.S. at 638. This will occur "[wihere the parties have agreed that the arbi-
tral body is to decide a defined set of claims." Id.
129. Id. at 638-39.
130. Id. at 639-40 n.21. The Court was specifically addressing exceptions to arbi-
trability grounded in domestic law.
131. Id. at 638. This is because the tribunal is bound to effectuate the intention of
the parties. Id. The Court reiterated the sentiment of the Second Circuit in 1942 that if
arbitral tribunals are to have a role in the international community, national courts will
need to "shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration .... Id. at 639 (quoting
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Armtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
132. 473 U.S. at 637.
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ment of arbitral awards if "recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country."1"
At the outset of his significant dissent, Justice Stevens13 1 criticized
the majority's concurrence with the First Circuit's interpretation of the
scope of the arbitration clause on two grounds. 1 3  First, although the
clause refers to two parties (Mitsubishi Motors Corp, ("MMC") and
Buyer), Soler's counterclaim alleged antitrust violations against both
MMC and CISA. In construing the clause very narrowly, Justice Ste-
vens believed that only "by stretching the language of the arbitration
clause far beyond its ordinary meaning could one possibly conclude
that it encompasses this three-party dispute."' 36 Second, finding that
Soler's antitrust claims were not included in Articles I-B through V of
the sales agreement, he was not persuaded by the First Circuit's ration-
ale that "the relationship between the dispute and those Articles
brought the arbitration clause into play. '"3 7
Justice Stevens turned next to the issue of whether an arbitration
may include coverage of a statutory remedy not expressly stated in the
clause.13 s Analyzing Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, he found
no support to suggest that the legislature intended to authorize arbi-
tration of statutory claims."3 9 He reasoned that Congress, in drafting
the Act, could not have foreseen the Court's response to whether an
arbitration clause referring to claims "arising out of or relating to a
contract" could be construed to cover statutory claims "that have only
an indirect relationship to the contract.'14 0
The dissent noted the existence of cases which held that arbitra-
tion does not bar the assertion of a statutory right.'4 ' In Alexander
14
133. Id. (quoting Convention, supra note 3, at Art. V(2)(b)). The Court observed,
however, that this substantive review should remain minimal. 473 U.S. at 638. This con-
clusion is undermined by the fact that any enforcement proceeding would have taken
place in Japan, not the United States. Lipner, supra note 122, at 426. Even if an award
was not enforced it would still have caused considerable time and expense. Id. at 430.
134. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined and
in which Justice Marshall joined except as to part II. Justices Brennan and Marshall also
dissented in Scherk, 417 U.S. 505 (1974).
135. 473 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 644. Justice Stevens explained that the words "in relation to" connected
claims arising under the contract and claims resulting from a breach of the contract. Id.
He believed that "all three of the species of arbitrable claims must be predicated on
contractual rights defined in Art. I-B through V." Id.
138. 473 U.S. at 646.
139. Id. at 645-46.
140. Id. at 646-47.
141. Id. These cases include McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Scherk v. Al-
[Vol. 8
MITSUBISHI MOTOR CORP.
and Barrentine,145 the Court acknowledged the inability of arbitration
to provide the best suited resolution of contractual disputes and recog-
nized the judiciary as better suited to resolve statutory issues which
rely on judicial construction."" Based on these cases, the dissent pos-
ited that arbitration clauses do not apply to federal statutory claims. '
The dissent persisted that Congress never intended enforcement
of arbitration clauses for the resolution of antitrust violations because
"[elvery violation of the antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise
system envisaged by Congress."" Justice Stevens emphasized the im-
portance that has been attached to American antitrust law by both the
Court and Congress: "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act
in particular are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as im-
portant to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enter-
prise system as the Bill of Rights is to protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms.' 4 7
The assertion was supported by citing the public's interest in anti-
trust litigation and the American Safety doctrine. 48 It was claimed
that arbitration proceedings in this case would not allow for sufficient
review of an arbitrator's decision if one was required. 49 The dissent
purported that such proceedings are unacceptable because of the po-
tential effect on American businesses.'50 Lastly, Justice Stevens criti-
cized the majority's international concerns and its reliance on
berto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
142. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
143. 420 U.S. 728 (1981).
144. 473 U.S. at 647-50. The Barrentine Court noted that "not only are arbitral pro-
cedures less protective of individual statutory rights than are judicial proceedings [cita-
tions omitted) but arbitrators are often powerless to grant the aggrieved employees as
broad a range of relief." 450 U.S. at 744-45, quoted in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 649. (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 54, 57.
145. 473 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens claimed that it was
reasonable to assume that most lawyers and businessmen would not interpret this clause
to include federal statutory claims. Id.
146. Id. at 654 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972)).
147. 473 U.S. at 651 (quoting United States v. Topco, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
The dissent also cited Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
252 U.S. 436, 440 (1920), in which the Court held that antitrust actions seeking treble
damages "can only be brought in a District Court of the United States." 473 U.S. at 656.
148. 473 U.S. at 655-56. The dissent recommended that the Court acknowledge the
wisdom of the court of appeals' adherence to this doctrine. Id. at 656.
149. Id. at 656-57. The arbitration procedure did not provide any right to discovery
or a written decision, and required that all proceedings be closed to the public. In addi-
tion, Japanese arbiters have no subpoena power. Id. at 657 n.31.
150. Id. at 657 n.32 and accompanying text. Especially, if an arbitrator condemned
necessary business practices under the antitrust laws. Id.
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Scherk.' 5 ' Quoting the amicus curiae brief of the United States, 52 he
noted the undisputed fact that the "Convention 'clearly contemplates'
that signatory nations will enforce domestic laws prohibiting the arbi-
tration of certain subject matters."'5 8 Construing Article II(1) of the
Convention, he explained that this "clause suggests some subjects that
are not capable of arbitration under domestic laws of the signatory na-
tions, and that agreements to arbitrate such disputes need not be en-
forced."" 4 Reading this clause with Article V(2) (a) and (b),'55 Justice
Stevens interpreted the Convention as stating that agreements to arbi-
trate disputes, otherwise nonarbitrable under domestic law, are not re-
quired to be enforced.
156
The dissent, while criticizing the Scherk Court, found its distinc-
tion of Wilko as a domestic application apposite in Mitsubishi. 16 7 Ste-
vens explicated that in Wilko it was unquestionable that American
federal securities law would apply. 5 1 Similarly, he asserted that it is
"perfectly clear that the rules of American antitrust law must govern
151. Id. at 658-665.
152. Id. at 658, citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28.
153. Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 659. The majority did not reject this interpretation of the First Circuit. Id.
at 641 n.21; See 723 F.2d at 162-66. For example, Belgium (statute limiting unilateral
termination of exclusive distributorships) and Italy (labor disputes) have both deemed
certain disputes nonarbitrable under the Convention. 473 U.S. at 660-61 n.35 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
155. 473 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 78, 80 and accompany-
ing text for the text of the Convention Art. 11(3) and Art. V(2) respectively.
156. 473 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's hesitancy to create an
exception to the Convention must have been influenced by the number of countries that
promote arbitration of antitrust disputes. These countries include: Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Pakistan,
Peru and Switzerland. Hoellering, supra note 6, at note 18. However, arbitration is not
always seen as the best solution. Western Europe, for instance, is broadening its anti-
trust statutes. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing
Need For Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 207 (1982). The Federal Republic of
Germany prohibits enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims
unless the agreement allows parties the alternative of resorting to state courts. Lipner,
supra note 122, at 417, n.18. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law 27.7 at 1567, as
amended, reprinted in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, Part D, 49 (1980) (cited in
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 661 n.36) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Delaume, TRANSNATIONAL
CONTRACTS, ch. XIII, § 13.06 n.3 (rev. ed. 1985) (noting German and French cases in
which enforcement of arbitral awards was declined when enforcement would have vio-
lated the public policy of the forum) (cited in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 661 n.36 (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
157. 473 U.S. at 662-663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 663. More specifically, Justice Stevens opined that when Mitsubishi enters
the American market, it must comply with United States law. Id. at 664.
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the claim of an American automobile dealer that he has been injured
by an international conspiracy to restrain trade in an American auto
market."' 59 Moreover, he stated that the federal government's intent in
protecting auto dealers from manufacturers is undermined by the
Court's decision.1 60
The dissent concluded on a vehement note. Justice Stevens criti-
cized the majority's view of arbitration as promoting "world unity" and
as an institution "designed to implement a formula for world peace."' 61
Most critical, however, was his assertion that arbitration in this case
did not carry a guaranty of fair process or economic freedom 162
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite several imperfections,'68 Mitsubishi has made a substan-
tial impact on the international commercial system. The most evident
is the requirement that parties to an international transaction adhere
to their arbitration agreement rather than escape their obligations.
Considering foreign hostility towards American antitrust enforce-
ment, 64 Mitsubishi must be viewed as a sincere attempt by the United
States to appease our allies in today's complex international commer-
cial arena. As a result, the United States has become a more attractive
forum for international arbitration agreements.
Despite this valiant effort, however, the Court has created another
stepping stone in this area rather than a clear direction for the resolu-
tion of future disputes. This problem arises because Mitsubishi's rea-
soning was primarily based on notions of international comity. Indeed,
Mitsubishi displays the Court's deference to the international commu-
nity rather than the national goals proscribed by American antitrust
laws. Mitsubishi, however, has as great an impact on the arbitrability
of domestic arbitration disputes.
While the Court criticized certain elements of the American
Safety, doctrine, 65 the Court admitted that it was not illegitimizing
the doctrine but was only refusing to extend the American Safety ra-
tionale to Mitsubishi. 166 Rather than overrule American Safety, the
159. Id. at 663.
160. Id. at 665.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 666.
163. See Lipner, supra note 122, at 414-32 for criticism of Mitsubishi.
164. Hawk, supra, note 156 at 208-12; Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 350, 354-56 (1983).
165. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
166. 473 U.S. at 629. "We find it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the Ameri-
can Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transac-
tions." Id.
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Court applied a balancing of international and national interests. This
approach will cause much confusion about the arbitrability of domestic
antitrust claims. Nevertheless, this is surely an area which the Su-
preme Court shall be beckoned to address in the near future. Indeed, it
is a decision that the American commercial system eagerly awaits. Al-
though the American Safety doctrine has been weakened by Mitsub-
ishi, it remains the law.167
It would seem illogical for domestic antitrust claims to remain
nonarbitrable while international claims are arbitrable. se Conversely,
it seems almost as illogical to hold domestic claims arbitrable based
solely on the international comity rationale of Mitsubishi. The ques-
tion of domestic arbitrability is not subject to international concerns or
agreements but to the American Safety doctrine which had established
a strong foothold in American jurisprudence. The Mitsubishi Court
seemed reluctant to base its rationale on criticism of such a revered
doctrine. Perhaps, the American Safety doctrine is not as endangered
as has been perceived.' 6s Of course, an affirmation of American Safety
would cast Mitsubishi, as characterized by Justice Stevens, as part of a
"formula for world peace." '
During the two years folowing Mitsubishi, lower federal court de-
cisions regarding the arbitration of other statutory claims, notably
those under the RICO statute, made it uncertain if American Safety
would get caught in the preferential tide of arbitration. 7 ' While it
167. American Safety is followed in at least six circuits. See supra note 64.
168. The Court has not envisioned this as illogical. The Court emphasized that the
factors in Mitsubishi demand enforcement of the arbitration agreement "even assuming
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S.
at 629.
169. Since Mitsubishi, one district court has held that domestic antitrust issues are
arbitrable. See Genna v. Lady Foot International, Inc., No. 85-4372, slip. op. (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 24, 1986). The district court determined that "[alithough [Mitsubishi] specifically
limited its holding to the international context, its reasoning is more compelling in the
domestic context." Id. See also Jacobsen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3rd Cir. 1986) (criticizing a case that declined to enforce arbitration
agreement for RICO claims because the court "paid too little deference to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mitsubishi").
170. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. The question whether private RICO claims may be arbitrated had been ad-
dressed by three circuit courts as of February, 1987. See McMahon v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. (1986) (holding private RICO claims nonarbitra-
ble) rev'd 55 U.S.L.W. 4757 (U.S. June 9, 1987); Jacobsen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that RICO claims may be
arbitrated when the offenses predicate to the required pattern of racketeering are arbi-
trable); Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986) (following neither McMahon




would be unfortunate if Mitsubishi had created a carte blanche atti-
tude favoring arbitration, this has been the result in view of the
Court's recent decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon."2 McMahon resolved the confusion that has emanated from Mit-
The Fifth Circuit opined that McMahon "ignore[d] Mitsubishi's instruction that
congressional intent governs the analysis of arbitrability of a statutory claim under the
Arbitration Act." Mayaja, 803 F.2d at 162 n.6. Both Mayaja and Jacobsen stressed that
"determining statutory claims to be be nonarbitrable on the basis of some judicially rec-
ognized public policy rather than as a matter of statutory interpretation is no longer
permissible." Jacobsen, 797 F.2d at 1202; Mayaja, 803 F.2d at 162 n.6. The American
Safety public policy analysis has been applied to RICO claims because the RICO statute,
like the antitrust statutes, contains a treble damages remedy and a no anti-waiver provi-
sion similar to the securities acts. See Mayaja, 803 F.2d at 164; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1982).
McMahon was authored by Judge Feinberg, the distinguished author of American
Safety. Judge Feinberg protected American Safety by distinguishing Mitsubishi as a
case involving "international" disputes. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98. Judge Feinberg com-
pared the policy concerns underlying the RICO statute as being similar to those underly-
ing the antitrust statutes. Id. He ascertained that a judicial forum is appropriate for
RICO claims because of these strong policy concerns. Id.
There is also much confusion amongst the lower courts on the arbitrability of RICO
claims. Compare Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.
Md. 1986) (nonarbitrable); Witt v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 602 F.
Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (nonarbitrable); Universal Marine Insurance Co. v. Bea-
con Insurance Co., 588 F. Supp. 735, 738 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (nonarbitrable); Steinberg v.
Illinois Company, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 615 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (arbitrable); Bob Ladd, Inc., v.
Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241, 243-44 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (arbitrable); Bale v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650 (D. Minn. 1986) (arbitrable).
Similar confusion exists amongst the courts regarding the arbitration of domestic
claims under the 1934 Securities Act. Compare McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (nonarbitrable);
Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986) (nonarbitrable);
Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir.) reh'g denied en
banc, 803 F.2d 1185 (1986) (nonarbitrable); Schriner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 635 F. Supp.
373 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (arbitrable); Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 635 F.
Supp. 234 (D. Md. 1986) (arbitrable); Sanders v. Robinson Humphrey/American Ex-
press, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (arbitrable). This confusion was sparked
by the Court's decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Although the Byrd Court noted that the applicability of Wilko to claims under the 1934
Act was questioned in Scherk, the Court declined to address the issue. Id. at 1240.
Confusion concerning arbitration also exists in the bankruptcy field. Allison, supra
note 66, at 399. Some courts have compelled arbitration of bankruptcy issues while
others have declined to enforce agreements to arbitrate bankruptcy issues. Compare
Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1038 (1984) (nonarbitrable); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 33 Bankr. 33 (N.D. Tex.
1983) (nonarbitrable); In re Morgan, 28 Bankr. 3 (9th Cir. 1983) (arbitrable); In re Hart
Ski Mfg., 711 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1983) (arbitrable).
172. 55 U.S.L.W. 4757 (U.S. June 9, 1987) rev'g 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986). In McMa-
hon, the Court held that domestic claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
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subishi during the past two years.
Based on the Court's decision in Mitsubishi and several other re-
cent decisions,"' notably McMahon, arbitration will play an even more
influential role in commercial agreements in the future. It is naive,
however, to believe that arbitration will always resolve antitrust dis-
putes.17 4 Nevertheless, arbitration will continue its respected standing
in the legal community. Consequently, counsel of parties to commercial
agreements will have to examine such agreements very cautiously
before determining which forum the agreements will expressly provide
for in the event of a statutory dispute. Most importantly, counsel for
such parties must advise their clients once " 'having made the bargain
to arbitrate,' they will be held to their bargain.' 7 5
Michael J. Geraghty
domestic RICO claims are arbitrable. The Court reasoned that "[njot only does Mitsub-
ishi support the arbitrability of RICO claims, but there is even more reason to suppose
that arbitration will adequately serve the purposes of RICO than that it will adequately
protect private enforcement of the antitrust laws." Id. at 4762.
The Court, however, did offer some hint of protection for the American Safety doc-
trine. While excluding RICO claims from nonarbitrable status, the Court stated that
"[tihe private attorney general rule for the typical RICO plaintiff is simply less plausible
than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff, and does not support a finding that there is
an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the enforcement of the RICO Statute."
Id. at 4763. With this statement, the Court has left open the "plausibility" that there is
an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and domestic claims under the antitrust
statute. Indeed, this may be too broad an interpretation. If so, the American Safety
doctrine has been so weakened that its days are numbered.
173. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, (1983).
174. Arbitration, for example, may inhibit business parties from bringing antitrust
claims. Small corporations, unlike large corporations, may be discouraged from interna-
tional transactions because of the expense of arbitration, which can be higher than litiga-
tion when in an international context. Rather than risk foreclosure from bringing possi-
ble antitrust claims, small corporations simply may avoid such international
transactions. Lipner, supra note 122, at 423 n.234 and accompanying text; Allison, supra
note 66, at 378; De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substi-
tute for National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 61 (1982) (discussing reasons for higher
expense); see Loevinger, supra note 68, at 1090-91; Pitofsky, supra note 69, at 1076-80
for a discussion of problems with arbitration generally.
175. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4763.
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